William James’ “The Will to Believe” (1896/1979) continues to attract scholarly attention. This might seem surprising since James’ central claim—that one may justifiably believe p despite having inconclusive evidence for p—seems both very clear and also very wrong. I argue that many of the interpretive and substantive challenges of this essay can be overcome by framing James’ thesis in terms of what Tamar Gendler defines as “alief.” I consider two readings of James’ position (one charitable, the other super-charitable) and conclude that the “will to believe” rests on a misnomer. “The Will to Alieve” is more accurate—though the “Right to Alieve” is even better still.

威廉·詹姆斯（William James）的《信仰的意愿》（The Will to Believe）（1896/1979）继续引起学术界的关注。这似乎令人惊讶，因为詹姆斯的核心要求，是一个可以名正言顺地相信p尽管具有决定性的证据p -seems都非常清楚，也非常错误的。我认为，本文的许多解释性和实质性挑战都可以通过以詹姆斯·塔玛·根德勒（Tamar Gendler）定义为“ alief”的框架来构筑詹姆斯的论文而得以克服。我考虑了两种关于詹姆斯立场的解读（一种是慈善的，另一种是超级慈善的），并得出结论，“相信”是基于错误的说法。“遗嘱的权利”更为准确，尽管“遗嘱的权利”甚至更好。