In Conservatism and Pragmatism, Seth Vannatta posits and explores several major conceptual and practical affinities between classical (especially Peircean) pragmatism and conservatism. Characterizing both as essentially methods rather than ideologies, he argues that the two ought to be understood as mutually supportive and corrective, and that they conjointly supply an especially robust set of intellectual resources relevant to contemporary moral, political, and legal concerns. This essay critically examines Vannatta’s marriage of conservatism and pragmatism in the realm of legal theory. It argues that while Vannatta’s work provides a rigorous pragmatist alternative to the familiar legal formalism adopted by many American conservatives, its foundations may be narrower than Vannatta appreciates and the resulting theory may have little necessary connection to the dispositional, methodological conservatism upon which it is purportedly based.

在保守主义和实用主义中，塞思·范纳塔（Seth Vannatta）提出并探讨了古典（尤其是皮尔士式）实用主义与保守主义之间的几种主要的概念上和实践上的联系。他认为这两种方法本质上都是方法，而不是意识形态，他认为这两种方法应该理解为相互支持和纠正，并且它们共同提供了与当代道德，政治和法律问题有关的特别强大的智力资源。本文从法律理论的角度批判性地考察了范纳塔的保守主义与实用主义的结合。它认为，尽管范纳塔的著作为许多美国保守派所采用的熟悉的法律形式主义提供了一种严格的实用主义选择，但其基础可能比范纳塔所理解的要狭窄，并且由此产生的理论可能与这种处置方式几乎没有必要的联系，