1 INTRODUCTION

Budget support has given rise to vigorous debates among practitioners and academics. Scholars have sought to analyse why this aid modality was adopted (e.g. Clist et al., 2012; Dietrich, 2013); whether or not it is effective (e.g. Dijkstra, 2018; Koeberle et al., 2006; IDD and Associates, 2006; Ronsholt, 2014); and under what conditions it is likely to be abandoned and/or suspended (e.g. Koch et al., 2017; Molenaers et al., 2015). Beyond budget support itself, these debates raise important questions about why donors and recipients favour specific aid modalities, and the impact of their choices on development policy.

Dijkstra critically engages with our article “The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid” (Swedlund & Lierl, 2020), published as a part of a special issue on “Ownership in a post-aid effectiveness era: Comparative perspectives”, guest-edited by Niels Keijzer and David Black. We appreciate the discussion of our work and the evolving debate, which will help to advance our understanding of different aid modalities and their implications for development policy.

In Swedlund and Lierl (2020), we argue that the key to understanding the implications of budget support for development policy priorities is the underlying bargaining logic between donor agencies and the governments of recipient countries. Our premise is that foreign aid, regardless of whether it is provided in the form of budget support or project aid, always involves political bargaining between donors and recipients. In other words, aid never comes without political strings, and those strings are not unilaterally determined by the donor.

For example, in exchange for aid, recipient governments may agree to political reforms that make governance more inclusive—an outcome that western donors value highly, but recipient governments are reluctant to engage in, because it limits their power and their ability to cater to their domestic political clientele. Donors, on the other hand, may make concessions with respect to demands for political reform, if in exchange they get more say over how the government spends its money; for example, if the government is willing to shift more resources towards development goals, such as health, infrastructure, education or social protection. We argue that donors are particularly concerned about the fungibility of aid. Hence, they care not just about reforming the political process, but also concretely about how and on what the government spends its money.

Moreover, we argue that donor commitment problems—i.e. donors’ incentives to renege on their aid promises in the long-term—constrain bargaining between donors and recipients. When this constraint is relaxed, different bargaining compromises become feasible. This is where we see the central transmission channel through which budget support affected donor–government bargaining: budget support was perceived to decrease donors’ commitment problems. In other aid modalities, donors have far greater incentives to dishonour aid commitments or shift their goalposts once the recipient government has satisfied their demands, because donors continue to control the planning of the interventions and the flow of resources. Through budget support, once disbursed, donors cede control over the use of aid provided to recipient governments.

Our empirical research in Rwanda and Tanzania confirmed that, while other forms of aid commitments were heavily discounted by the recipient governments, budget support was initially seen as a much more reliable form of aid and therefore more attractive to them. Since budget support was more valuable to recipient governments, they were willing to give donors greater policy influence in exchange for it. But, this also had implications on political inclusivity, particularly the inclusion of civil society actors in debates about fiscal spending.

中文翻译：

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为了理解不同援助方式的影响，我们需要分析捐助者和受援国政府之间的谈判逻辑*

1 介绍

预算支持引起了从业者和学者之间的激烈辩论。学者们试图分析为什么采用这种援助方式（例如 Clist 等人，2012 年；Dietrich，2013 年）；是否有效（例如 Dijkstra，2018 年；Koeberle 等人，2006 年；IDD 和 Associates，2006 年；Ronsholt，2014 年）；以及在什么条件下它可能会被放弃和/或暂停（例如 Koch 等人，2017 年；Molenaers 等人，2015 年）。除了预算支持本身之外，这些辩论还提出了一些重要问题，即为什么捐助者和受援者偏爱特定的援助方式，以及他们的选择对发展政策的影响。

Dijkstra 批判性地参与了我们的文章“预算支持的兴衰：对外援助中的所有权、谈判和捐助者承诺问题”（Swedlund & Lierl，2020 年），该文章作为“援助后的所有权”特刊的一部分出版有效性时代：比较视角”，由 Niels Keijzer 和 David Black 客座编辑。我们赞赏对我们工作的讨论和不断演变的辩论，这将有助于增进我们对不同援助方式及其对发展政策影响的理解。

在 Swedlund 和 Lierl（2020 年）中，我们认为，理解预算支持对发展政策优先事项的影响的关键是捐助机构与受援国政府之间的基本谈判逻辑。我们的前提是，对外援助，无论是以预算支持还是项目援助的形式提供，总是涉及捐助方和受援方之间的政治谈判。换句话说，援助从来没有没有政治条件，而这些条件也不是由捐助者单方面决定的。

例如，为换取援助，受援国政府可能同意进行政治改革，使治理更具包容性——西方捐助者高度重视这一结果，但受援国政府不愿参与，因为这限制了他们的权力和能力来满足他们的需求。国内政治客户。另一方面，捐助者可能会在政治改革要求方面做出让步，如果作为交换，他们对政府如何花钱有更多发言权；例如，如果政府愿意将更多资源用于发展目标，例如健康、基础设施、教育或社会保护。我们认为捐助者特别关注援助的可替代性。因此，他们关心的不仅仅是改革政治进程，

此外，我们认为捐助者承诺问题——即捐助者长期违背其援助承诺的动机——限制了捐助者和受援者之间的讨价还价。当这个限制被放松时，不同的讨价还价妥协变得可行。这就是我们看到预算支持影响捐助者与政府讨价还价的中央传输渠道的地方：预算支持被认为可以减少捐助者的承诺问题。在其他援助方式中，一旦受援国政府满足了他们的要求，捐助者就会更有动力违背援助承诺或改变目标，因为捐助者继续控制干预计划和资源流动。通过预算支持，一旦支付，捐助者就放弃了对提供给受援国政府的援助使用的控制权。

我们在卢旺达和坦桑尼亚的实证研究证实，虽然其他形式的援助承诺被受援国政府严重打折扣，但预算支持最初被视为一种更可靠的援助形式，因此对他们更具吸引力。由于预算支持对受援国政府更有价值，他们愿意给予捐助者更大的政策影响以换取它。但是，这也对政治包容性产生了影响，尤其是将民间社会参与者纳入有关财政支出的辩论中。