Managers of at‐risk firms have incentives to prolong the life of the company or to extract personal wealth prior to firm liquidation, and they can pursue a number of activities in order to achieve these goals. Prior studies have investigated the consequences of managers becoming targets for acquisition. In this study, we examine the consequences of at‐risk firms doing the opposite: buying other firms (i.e., becoming at‐risk acquirers). We find two positive consequences of becoming at‐risk acquirers. At‐risk acquirers (1) avoid delisting due to poor performance and (2) leave at‐risk status in the year following the acquisition. We also find that these benefits are only temporary and come at a cost. Specifically, at‐risk acquirers are less likely to become subsequent targets, and they quickly return to at‐risk status. These results indicate that the decision of the manager of an at‐risk firm to become an at‐risk acquirer buys the manager more time but does not help the firm.

中文翻译：

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有风险的收购者：生存策略还是最后的努力？

处于风险中的公司的经理人有动机延长公司的寿命或在公司清算之前提取个人财富，他们可以开展许多活动来实现这些目标。先前的研究已经调查了经理成为收购目标的后果。在本研究中，我们研究了风险公司采取相反措施的后果：购买其他公司（即成为风险收购者）。我们发现成为高风险收购者有两个积极的后果。有风险的收购方（1）避免因业绩不佳而退市；（2）在收购后的第二年保持高风险状态。我们还发现，这些好处只是暂时的，而且要付出一定的代价。具体来说，处于风险中的收购方不太可能成为后续目标，因此它们会迅速恢复为处于风险状态。