This article studies moral hazard in teams where workers' wages depend on two types of performance measures: objective team output and subjective evaluations. The evaluations include both self‐ and peer evaluations. I find that when evaluations become less subjective, workers' wages should be more sensitive not only to their evaluations but also to the team's output. I also show that subjective evaluations should be used in relative terms only when the degree of subjectivity is not too high. The results also associate the introduction of a budget breaker with the level of subjectivity within organizations.

中文翻译：

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主观评估团队的道德风险

本文研究了员工工资取决于两种绩效指标的团队中的道德风险：客观的团队产出和主观评估。评估包括自我评估和同伴评估。我发现，当评估变得不太主观时，工人的工资不仅应该对他们的评估敏感，还应该对团队的产出更加敏感。我还表明，仅当主观度不太高时才应相对使用主观评估。结果还将预算破坏者的引入与组织内部的主观性联系起来。