The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer on the profitability of chain members in a Retailer—E-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference. We have considered two distinct channel power structures in this study, i.e., (i) retailer has higher channel power than the e-tailer and (ii) e-tailer has higher channel power than the retailer. Game-theoretic models are developed to examine the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal decisions under equal wholesale price strategy and discriminatory wholesale price strategy for the channel power structures considered. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product. We have found that discriminatory wholesale price strategy is the gainful strategy (i) for a manufacturer dealing with products having high online channel preference under retailer leader structure (ii) for the manufacturer dealing with products having low online channel preference under e-tailer leader structure. Equal wholesale price strategy is the gainful strategy (i) for a manufacturer dealing with products having low online channel preference under retailer leader structure and (ii) for a manufacturer dealing with products having high online channel preference under e-tailer leader structure. The study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product and the downstream channel power structure.

本文的目的是调查制造商的批发价格歧视对基于在线渠道偏好的不同产品类别的零售商－电子零售商双渠道供应链中链成员的获利能力的影响。在本研究中，我们考虑了两种截然不同的渠道权力结构，即（i）零售商的渠道权力高于电子零售商，以及（ii）电子零售商的渠道权力高于零售商。建立了博弈论模型，以检验零售商和电子零售商之间的竞争，并根据所考虑的渠道力量结构，在同等批发价格策略和歧视性批发价格策略下得出最优决策。进一步，数值示例用于量化结果并捕获有关产品在线渠道偏好的变化。我们发现，歧视性批发价格策略是有益的策略（i）对于在零售商领导者结构下处理具有较高在线渠道偏好的产品的制造商（ii）对于在电子零售商领导者结构下处理具有较低在线渠道偏好的产品的制造商。平等的批发价格策略是有益的策略（i）对于制造商而言在零售商领导者结构下处理在线渠道偏好低的产品，以及（ii）对制造商而言在电子零售商领导者结构下具有在线渠道偏好高的产品。