This study examines the influence of directors’ and CEOs’ networks in the appointment of female directors. Building on social identity theory and social network theory, we argue that since men and women are members of different networks, recruitment practices based on networks prevent women from accessing board positions. We also examine the role of board gender diversity regulation on the influence of networks, hypothesizing that such regulations help in deinstitutionalizing ‘old boys’ networks’, based on institutional theory. Using a sample of 32,819 new board appointments in the largest listed firms of 17 European countries, the USA and Canada, we determine whether new directors are directly linked through employment, board, charities or club memberships, to the incumbent directors or the CEO. We find that the probability that the new director appointed is a woman decreases by approximately 28% when the new director is associated with one of the incumbent directors. We also find that gender diversity regulation reduces the influence of networks in the appointment of female directors. Our results provide archival evidence that board networks hinder the recruitment of female directors and that gender diversity hard and soft laws deinstitutionalize old boys’ networks.

中文翻译：

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老男孩网络和监管方法在女性董事甄选过程中的作用

本研究考察了董事和 CEO 网络对任命女性董事的影响。基于社会认同理论和社会网络理论，我们认为由于男性和女性是不同网络的成员，基于网络的招聘实践会阻止女性进入董事会职位。我们还研究了董事会性别多样性监管对网络影响的作用，假设这些监管有助于根据制度理论去制度化“老男孩”网络。我们使用 17 个欧洲国家、美国和加拿大的最大上市公司的 32,819 名新董事会任命样本，确定新董事是否通过就业、董事会、慈善机构或俱乐部会员资格与现任董事或首席执行官直接相关。我们发现，当新董事与其中一位现任董事有关联时，被任命的新董事是女性的概率降低了大约 28%。我们还发现，性别多样性监管减少了网络对女性董事任命的影响。我们的研究结果提供了档案证据，证明董事会网络阻碍了女性董事的招聘，并且性别多样性硬法律和软法律使老男孩的网络去机构化。