Abstract

Proxy advisory firms developed due to market failures underlying voting and corporate governance more broadly. However, these firms, which have not been subject to mandatory regulation, reflect their own market failures, emphasizing challenges underlying corporate governance. We highlight underlying frictions, such as economies of scale and public goods aspects to information production, the import of incentive conflicts faced by the advisory firms, their power, and the implications of their recommendations and votes by different types of investors. Asset managers emphasizing stewardship are more supportive of management than are proxy advisors. We highlight the evolving regulatory environment and limitations of one-size-fits-all recommendations. (JEL G34, G38, G24, H4)Received October 31, 2019; editorial decision October 17, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

中文翻译：

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代理咨询公司，治理，市场失灵和监管

摘要

由于投票和公司治理基础上的市场失灵，代理咨询公司得到了发展。但是，这些没有受到强制性监管的公司反映了自身的市场失灵，强调了公司治理所面临的挑战。我们着重指出潜在的摩擦，例如信息生产的规模经济和公共产品方面，咨询公司面临的激励性冲突的引入，其权力以及不同类型的投资者提出的建议和投票的含义。强调管理的资产经理比代理顾问更支持管理。我们强调不断发展的监管环境和“一刀切”的建议的局限性。（JELG34，G38，G24，H4）2019年10月31日收到; 编辑决定：编辑安德鲁·埃卢（Andrew Ellul）于2020年10月17日作出。