This paper proposes a model of statehood, defined as elite extraction of resources from a subject population. Different from most of the existing literature, the size of the subject population evolves endogenously in a Malthusian fashion, and the elite take into account the effects on future population levels when taxing the current population. The elite can spend extracted resources by investing in productive and extractive capacities. Productive capacity increases the size of the pie, while extractive capacity makes it easier for the elite to tax it. Together—but not each on its own—these two types of investment can give rise to multiple steady-state equilibria, such that one steady state has both a higher rate of extraction, and higher population density and output, than the other steady state. The model can also account for a positive empirical relationship between land productivity and state antiquity among countries with relatively late state development.

本文提出了一个国家模式，定义为精英从主体人群中提取资源。与大多数现有文献不同，主体人口的规模以马尔萨斯的方式内生发展，精英在对当前人口征税时会考虑对未来人口水平的影响。精英可以通过投资于生产和开采能力来使用开采的资源。生产能力增加了蛋糕的大小，而开采能力使精英更容易对其征税。这两种类型的投资一起——但不是各自独立——可以产生多个稳态均衡，这样一个稳态比另一个稳态具有更高的提取率、更高的人口密度和产出。