The context of this work is a voting scenario in which each voter expresses his/her level of affinity about a proposal, by choosing a value in the set \({\mathcal {J}}=\{-j,\dots ,-1,0,1,\dots ,j\}\), and these individual votes produce a collective result, in the same set \({\mathcal {J}}\), through a decision function. The simple majority, defined for \(j=1\), is a widely used example of such a decision function. In this paper, a set of independent axioms is proved to uniquely characterize the j-majority decision function. The j-majority decision is defined for any positive integer j, and it coincides with the simple majority decision when \(j=1\). In this way, this axiomatic characterization meets two goals: it gives a new characterization of the simple majority decision when \(j=1\) and it extends May’s theorem to this broader context.

这项工作的背景是一个投票场景，其中每个投票者通过选择集合\（{\ mathcal {J}} = \ {-j，\ dots，- 1,0,1，\ dots，j \} \），这些单票通过决策函数在同一组\（{\ mathcal {J}} \）中产生一个集体结果。为\（j = 1 \）定义的简单多数是这种决策函数的广泛使用的示例。在本文中，证明了一组独立的公理可以唯一刻画j多数决策函数。所述Ĵ -majority决定为任意的正整数定义Ĵ，并将其与简单多数决定一致时\（J = 1 \）。这样，这种公理化表征满足了两个目标：当\（j = 1 \）时，它给出了简单多数决定的新表征，并将May定理扩展到了更广泛的上下文。