Purpose

This research aims to examine the moderating role of CEO power on the relationship between retrenchment strategy and firm performance by framing the relationship under an agency theory, and power circulation theory.

Design/methodology/approach

This study focuses on a sample of 319 non-financial public listed companies in Malaysia from the year 2011–2016 and estimates the model under two-step GMM panel regression to eliminate the endogeneity issue.

Findings

The results show that the retrenchment strategy increased firm performance. Meanwhile, greater CEO power changes that retrenchment effect into increased performance. This study also indicates the CEO power strengthens the relationship between firm performance and retrenchment. However, CEO power does not have any effect on the performance of low retrenchment, and the performance of big firm size.

Research limitations/implications

The findings show that the higher CEO power cause higher firm performance and higher retrenchment. This research suggests that CEO power can make retrenchment strategy works and the decision made can affect the firm performance significantly.

Originality/value

This study examines the effect of CEO power on the performance of retrenchment strategy implementation by contesting agency theory, power circulation theory, and resource-based view theory within the emerging country context.

中文翻译：

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CEO的权力对裁员策略的执行有影响吗？

目的

本研究旨在通过建立代理理论和权力循环理论下的关系，研究首席执行官权力在裁员策略与公司绩效之间关系中的调节作用。

设计/方法/方法

这项研究侧重于2011年至2016年间马来西亚319家非金融上市公司的样本，并通过两步GMM面板回归来估计模型，以消除内生性问题。

发现

结果表明，裁员策略提高了公司绩效。同时，更大的首席执行官权力改变了裁员效应，从而提高了绩效。这项研究还表明，首席执行官的权力加强了公司绩效与裁员之间的关系。但是，首席执行官的权力对低裁员的业绩以及大公司规模的业绩没有任何影响。

研究局限/意义

研究结果表明，更高的首席执行官权力会导致更高的公司绩效和更高的裁员率。这项研究表明，CEO的权力可以使裁员策略发挥作用，而做出的决定会严重影响公司的绩效。

创意/价值

本研究通过在新兴国家背景下竞争代理理论，权力循环理论和基于资源的观点理论，研究了首席执行官权力对裁员策略实施绩效的影响。