Purpose

This paper aims to help build awareness with financial institutions about the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules and theme assures that financial institution scan adopt to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”.

Design/methodology/approach

The research took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as a 2019 report on Money Mules by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL); a 2019 and 2020 report on Money Mules by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Better Business Bureau (BBB); the Financial Action Task Force Guidance on the Risk Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High Level Principles and Procedures) 2007; the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012; the United Kingdom’s Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017; the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 2014; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2018; The UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended); the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part I June 2017 (Amended December 2017); the United States Codified Bank Secrecy Act Regulations (31 CFR); the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 (as amended); and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part II: Sectoral Guidance June 2017 (Amended December 2017).

Findings

This paper determined that financial institutions may be able to prevent proceeds of crime from being laundered by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules if they focus monitoring resources on the emotionally vulnerable customers like newcomers to the country, unemployed people who may have lost their jobs because of a pandemic like COVID-19, students and those in economic hardship; pay very close attention to the country of origin where the funds emanate from; pay very close attention to the country where the funds are being transferred to; and pay close attention to frequent large cash deposits followed by wire transfers.

Originality/value

While most articles focus on the money laundering risk(s) associated with Money Mules and the measures that individuals can use to ensure that their bank accounts are not used by criminals to launder illicit funds, this paper focuses on the different mechanisms that banks can use to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. This paper recommends a proportional approach that balances anti-money laundering measures, financial inclusion and human rights. The mechanisms/measures which have been extensively discussed in this paper will help banks to identify, assess and understand their money laundering and terrorist financing risks as it relates to Money Mules and take commensurate measures to mitigate them.

中文翻译：

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识别并减少不知不觉被招募为货币法则的个人所构成的洗钱风险

目的

本文旨在帮助金融机构提高对不知不觉被招募为“穆勒斯”的个人所带来的洗钱风险的认识，并确保金融机构进行扫描以检测非法资金，这些资金被注入低风险或低风险的银行账户中。在不知不觉中被招募为“钱Mul子”的中等风险客户。

设计/方法/方法

该研究采取案头研究的形式，该研究分析了各种文件和报告，例如欧盟执法合作局（EUROPOL）关于钱穆勒的2019年报告; 联邦调查局（FBI）和商业改善局（BBB）关于钱Money子的2019年和2020年报告; 《金融行动特别工作组关于打击洗钱和恐怖主义融资的基于风险的方法的指导》（高级原则和程序），2007年；《 2012年金融行动特别工作组建议》；英国《 2017年洗钱，恐怖主义融资和资金转移（付款人信息）条例》；《 2014年美国联邦金融机构审查委员会银行保密法/反洗钱审查手册》；透明国际腐败感知指数2018; 英国《 2002年犯罪收益法》（修订本）；联合洗钱督导小组JMLSG，《防止洗钱/打击恐怖主义筹资：英国金融部门指南》，第一部分，2017年6月（2017年12月修订）; 美国《银行法典》（31 CFR）；《 2011年尼日利亚禁止洗钱法》（经修订）；联合洗钱督导小组JMLSG，《防止洗钱/打击恐怖分子融资：英国金融业指南》第二部分：行业指南，2017年6月（2017年12月修订）。美国《银行法典》（31 CFR）；《 2011年尼日利亚禁止洗钱法》（经修订）；联合洗钱督导小组JMLSG，《防止洗钱/打击恐怖分子融资：英国金融业指南》第二部分：行业指南，2017年6月（2017年12月修订）。美国《银行法典》（31 CFR）；《 2011年尼日利亚禁止洗钱法》（经修订）；联合洗钱督导小组JMLSG，《防止洗钱/打击恐怖分子融资：英国金融业指南》第二部分：行业指南，2017年6月（2017年12月修订）。

发现

本文确定，如果金融机构将监视资源集中在那些情绪脆弱的客户（如到该国的新移民，可能失去其工作的失业人员）上，则可能能够防止在不知不觉中被招募为“钱Mul子”的个人洗钱。因COVID-19等大流行而造成的工作，学生以及经济困难的人；密切注意资金来自的原籍国；密切注意资金转移到的国家；并密切注意频繁的大量现金存款，然后进行电汇。

创意/价值

尽管大多数文章都关注与“穆勒”相关的洗钱风险以及个人可以用来确保犯罪分子不使用其银行账户洗钱的措施，但本文重点关注银行可以使用的各种机制侦查在不知不觉中被招募为“钱Mul子”的低风险或中风险客户的银行账户中所收到的非法资金。本文提出了一种在反洗钱措施，金融包容性和人权之间取得平衡的比例方法。本文中已广泛讨论的机制/措施将帮助银行识别，评估和了解其与洗钱relates有关的洗钱和恐怖主义融资风险，并采取相应的措施来减轻这些风险。