We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a principal–agent approach. The principal represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of shortage, and the agent represents the electricity capacity owners, who invest in capacity and produce electricity to satisfy the demand of consumers, and are subject to financial risks. Following the methodology of [J. Cvitanić, D. Possamaï & N. Touzi (2018) Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems, Finance and Stochastics 22(1), 1–37], we propose an optimal contract, from the perspective of consumers, which complements the revenue capacity owners achieved from the spot energy market, and incentivizes both parties to perform an optimal level of investment while sharing the physical and financial risks. Numerical results provide insights on the necessity of a capacity remuneration mechanism and also show how this is especially true when the level of uncertainties on demand or production side increases.

中文翻译：

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能力报酬机制的委托代理方法

我们建议通过委托代理方法研究电力容量报酬机制设计。委托人代表电力消费者的集合体（或代表实体），承受短缺的物理风险，代理人代表电力容量所有者，他们投资容量并生产电力以满足消费者的需求，并受制于金融风险。遵循[J. Cvitanić, D. Possamaï & N. Touzi (2018) Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent questions, Finance and Stochastics 22(1), 1-37]，我们从消费者的角度提出了一个最优合同，它补充了收入从现货能源市场获得的产能所有者，并激励双方在分担物理和财务风险的同时进行最佳投资水平。数值结果提供了关于能力补偿机制必要性的见解，并表明当需求或生产方面的不确定性水平增加时，这一点尤其正确。