We experimentally investigated three variants of a real-effort game with taxation that differed in the degree of redistribution of tax revenue. Concretely, we compared a Leviathan scenario, where no tax is redistributed, with a situation where tax revenues are used to finance a public good involving neither a direct nor immediate monetary transfer to participants and with a scenario where direct transfer payments are made to each participant. Our results confirm previous findings of a nonlinear decreasing relationship between tax rate and work effort. We found that, for tax rates above 50 percent, the level of effort was highest under direct redistribution, followed by the public-good scenario, and by the Leviathan case. Conducting the experiment in Canada, France, and Germany, we observed average effort (and thus tax revenues) to be higher in France than in Canada and Germany.

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劳动力供给、税收和税收的使用：加拿大、法国和德国的实际努力实验

我们通过实验研究了税收收入再分配程度不同的实战博弈的三种变体。具体而言，我们比较了不重新分配税收的利维坦情景、税收用于资助既不直接也不立即向参与者进行货币转移的公共产品的情况，以及直接向每个参与者进行转移支付的情况。 . 我们的结果证实了之前关于税率和工作努力之间非线性递减关系的发现。我们发现，对于高于 50% 的税率，直接再分配下的努力程度最高，其次是公益情景和利维坦案例。在加拿大、法国和德国进行实验，