The Iranian banking system engages in financial repression, and there are legal restrictions on interest rate. However, micro-evidence shows that the interest rates paid by Iranian firms in this condition are different across firms. This article aims to investigate the roots of the difference in borrowing rates by exploring the effects of the borrowers’ ownership structure and bank–firm relationship features. Using data collected from companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2007–2016, empirical models are estimated through applying the dynamic panel data regression method. According to the estimation results, the presence of an institutional stockholder, and particularly banks, among a firm’s shareholders can generally reduce its borrowing rate. Moreover, the results show that the financing rate is significantly lower in the firms with more than 20 per cent of their shares owned by the government. In addition, the findings suggest that borrowers of unhealthy banks, in terms of non-performing loans (NPL), bear a higher finance rate.

伊朗的银行系统从事金融压制，利率也受到法律限制。但是，微观证据表明，在这种情况下，伊朗企业支付的利率在企业之间是不同的。本文旨在通过探讨借款人所有权结构和银企关系特征的影响，来研究借款利率差异的根源。使用从德黑兰证券交易所（TSE）上市的公司2007-2016年收集的数据，通过采用动态面板数据回归方法估算经验模型。根据估算结果，机构股东特别是银行在公司股东中的存在通常可以降低其借贷利率。而且，结果表明，拥有超过20％的股份由政府所有的公司的融资率明显较低。此外，研究结果表明，就不良贷款而言，不良银行的借款人的融资利率较高。