This article builds on the intellectual legacy of Jan Tinbergen by extending his analysis on welfare and security into a framework involving strategic interaction. I first incorporate welfare and security in terms of interstate tensions into a single utility or payoff function. An uncertain world is characterized by states that are more peaceful, and others where nations are more hostile to each other. Both conflictual and peaceful outcomes lie along a spectrum of hostility short of war. The strategies adopted by the two countries, which promote peace, can be complements or substitutes. This means that they can go up or down in response to increases in the strategies of its rival. I demonstrate that non-cooperative behaviour between nations is Pareto inferior to cooperative behaviour, because the latter is associated with more actions and efforts to promote peace. Cooperative behaviour is akin to Tinbergen’s notion of world government. Non-cooperative behaviour by states also leads to moral hazard, and there can be free-riding in joint peaceful behaviour by some nations, particularly when the strategies of the countries are substitutes. The model is extended to aggressive international behaviour, including that mandated by populist plebiscites or election victories, as well as an outline of individual behaviour driven by identity-based politics.

本文基于扬·廷伯格根（Jan Tinbergen）的知识遗产，将他对福利和安全的分析扩展到涉及战略互动的框架中。我首先将州际关系紧张方面的福利和安全纳入单个效用或收益函数中。不确定的世界的特征是国家更加和平，而其他国家的国家之间则更加敌对。冲突与和平的结果都存在于战争以外的一系列敌对行动中。两国采取的促进和平的战略可以是补充或替代。这意味着它们可以根据其竞争对手的战略增长而上升或下降。我证明了国家间的非合作行为不如合作行为的帕累托，因为后者与促进和平的更多行动和努力有关。合作行为类似于Tinbergen的世界政府概念。国家的不合作行为也会导致道德风险，某些国家的联合和平行为可能会搭便车，尤其是当这些国家的战略替代时。该模型扩展到侵略性的国际行为，包括民粹主义公民投票或选举胜利所要求的行为，以及基于身份的政治驱动的个人行为概述。特别是当国家的战略是替代品时。该模型扩展到侵略性的国际行为，包括民粹主义公民投票或选举胜利所要求的行为，以及基于身份的政治驱动的个人行为概述。特别是当国家的战略是替代品时。该模型扩展到侵略性的国际行为，包括民粹主义公民投票或选举胜利所要求的行为，以及基于身份的政治驱动的个人行为概述。