Our study compares the efficacy of mixed bargaining strategies to strict coercion or accommodation. While mixed strategies can be approached from different conceptual angles, we focus on flexible and/or firm postures as signaling properties of bargaining. In our theory and empirical analysis, we show that the combination of firmness with flexibility on both sides, without necessarily scripted rules as in tit-for-tat, leads to peaceful resolution without unilateral concessions. Its opposite, resolute firmness is unlikely to make the opponent yield, as assumed in influential literature of the traditional canon. If anything, war is most likely when both sides opt for it. We provide the theoretical rationale for these expectations, which are validated in our empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the 1918 to 2015 period. Our study also points to the bargaining process as a potential causal mechanism between democracy and peace, and therefore has relevant implications for several research strands.

我们的研究将混合议价策略对严格强制或调和的效力进行了比较。虽然可以从不同的概念角度探讨混合策略，但我们将重点放在灵活和/或牢固的姿势上，作为讨价还价的信号属性。在我们的理论和实证分析中，我们表明，双方牢固性与灵活性的结合，而不必像针锋相对一样编写成文的规则，从而导致和平解决而没有单方面的让步。正如传统佳能的有影响力的文献所假定的那样，与之相反的，坚决的坚定性不可能使对手屈服。如果有的话，当双方选择战争时，战争极有可能发生。我们为这些期望提供了理论基础，我们在对1918年至2015年期间的ICB危机数据集进行的经验分析中对此进行了验证。