A number of proposals for reducing tensions with North Korea have discussed alterations to the program of joint military exercises (JMEs) that South Korea holds. North Korea has also repeatedly called for a reduction or secession of JMEs. Would limiting or halting JMEs be a useful concession for securing a reduction of tensions on the peninsula? We argue that JMEs do not deter North Korea but, instead, provoke provocative rhetoric and actions, demonstrating that North Korea views JMEs as a serious threat to its security. In this paper, we establish a relationship between JMEs and North Korea’s actions. In response to a JME, North Korea can issue warnings or threats as well as take costly signals such as conducting missile or nuclear tests. Using new data on JMEs and North Korean behavior, we find that North Korea systematically responds with aggression to South Korean JMEs. Moreover, we find that the intensity of North Korea’s responses to JMEs is driven by the severity of the threat particular exercises pose, indicating that North Korea responds to JMEs as serious security threats.

为减轻与朝鲜的紧张关系的许多建议讨论了对韩国举行的联合军事演习（JME）计划的修改。朝鲜也一再呼吁减少或分离JME。为了确保减少半岛上的紧张局势，限制或停止JME会是一个有用的让步吗？我们认为，准军事力量并没有阻止朝鲜，反而激起了挑衅性的言论和行动，表明朝鲜将准军事力量视为对其安全的严重威胁。在本文中，我们建立了JME与朝鲜的行动之间的关系。作为对JME的回应，朝鲜可以发出警告或威胁，并采取昂贵的信号，例如进行导弹或核试验。使用有关JME和朝鲜人行为的新数据，我们发现，朝鲜对韩国JME进行了系统的攻击。此外，我们发现朝鲜对JME做出反应的强度是由特定演习构成的威胁的严重性决定的，这表明朝鲜对JME的响应是严重的安全威胁。