This article tests cultural and economic explanations of why the longest surviving illiberal government in Central Europe, Hungary’s FIDESZ, has maintained popular support throughout two elections despite dismantling institutional checks and balances. Much of the literature on illiberalism in Central Europe attributes the appeal and successes of these governments to the brand of identity politics and rhetorical vilification of “others” practiced by their leaders. Yet the role of economic growth, a strong determinant of voter behaviour, has received little theoretical attention in accounting for illiberal party support. Using five rounds of European Social Survey data from 2010 to 2018, I show that economic satisfaction rather than a host of cultural factors, notably anti-migrant and anti-European Union attitudes, better predicts support for FIDESZ and satisfaction with government. I examine the implications of these results for understanding and conceptualising voter behaviour under backsliding. Voters may not understand what backsliding is and therefore are unable to penalise it or they may take information about backsliding into account and judge backsliding to be the price of prosperity. These findings and the discussion of voter behaviour raise important questions about the role of economic growth in sustaining illiberalism in Central Europe and other third wave democracies.

本文测试了文化和经济方面的解释，以说明为何中欧生存时间最长的非法政府，即匈牙利的FIDESZ，尽管取消了体制制衡，但在整个两次选举中都保持了民众的支持。中欧关于自由主义的许多文献都将这些政府的吸引力和成功归功于其领导人实施的“身份政治”和对“其他人”的侮辱性烙印。然而，经济增长的作用是决定投票者行为的重要因素，在解释非党派支持时，理论上很少受到关注。使用2010年至2018年的五轮欧洲社会调查数据，我发现经济满意度而不是一系列文化因素，尤其是反移民和反欧洲联盟的态度，更好地预测对FIDESZ的支持以及对政府的满意度。我研究了这些结果对理解和概念化选民行为的影响。选民可能不了解什么是后退，因此无法对其进行惩罚，或者他们可能考虑到有关后退的信息，并认为后退是繁荣的代价。这些发现和对选民行为的讨论提出了有关经济增长在维持中欧和其他第三波民主国家的自由主义中的作用的重要问题。选民可能不了解什么是后退，因此无法对其进行处罚，或者他们可能考虑到有关后退的信息，并认为后退是繁荣的代价。这些发现和对选民行为的讨论提出了有关经济增长在维持中欧和其他第三波民主国家的自由主义中的作用的重要问题。选民可能不了解什么是后退，因此无法对其进行处罚，或者他们可能考虑到有关后退的信息，并认为后退是繁荣的代价。这些发现和对选民行为的讨论提出了有关经济增长在维持中欧和其他第三波民主国家的自由主义中的作用的重要问题。