Abstract

Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A corollary upshot of the article is that whether hallucinations are possible or not is still an open empirical question.

中文翻译：

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关于幻觉的可能性

摘要

许多人以幻觉的可能性来暗示一个关系主义者的说法是错误的，根据这种观点，知觉经验是由与普通的独立于心理的客体的直接关系构成的。关系主义者之间的共同反应是采取析取主义的观点，即否认幻觉与感知经验具有相同的性质。本文提出了对幻觉论证的非析取论者的回应，他认为支持幻觉可能性的所谓经验和先验证据尚无定论。这篇文章的一个必然结果是，幻觉是否可能仍然是一个开放的经验性问题。