Abstract

The strategies of subordinate states in hegemonic or asymmetrical relations have been widely studied by international relations scholars. Such works generally focus on how a subordinate state can influence the hegemon's behavior so as to address and further the interests of the subordinate state. The relation between subordinate-state agency and the hegemonic system, the makeup of the hegemonic order, itself receives less attention. Through analysis of two cases of US hegemony in Latin America, this article examines how subordinate-state agency may strengthen or weaken the hegemonic system and, as such, makes a case for subordinate-state agency as an underpinning element of hegemony. It explores Colombian agency in the design phase of Plan Colombia as contributing to US hegemony, while Bolivian agency under the presidency of Evo Morales is examined as a challenge. In both instances, it was the United States, rather than the Latin American states, that took on a passive role, leaving the initiative with Colombia and Bolivia. Therefore, instead of reaffirmations of active one-way US hegemony versus passive subordinate states, the paper proposes to understand both cases as demonstrating the importance of subordinate-state agency in the configuration of the hegemonic system.

中文翻译：

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下属国家机构与美国霸权：哥伦比亚同意与玻利维亚不同意见

摘要

国际关系学者广泛研究了霸权或不对称关系中的从属策略。这些工作通常集中于从属国家如何影响霸权的行为，从而解决和促进从属国家的利益。从属国家机构与霸权体系之间的关系，霸权秩序的构成本身很少受到关注。通过对美国在拉丁美洲的两个霸权案件的分析，本文考察了从属国家机构如何加强或削弱霸权体系，因此，为从属国家机构作为霸权的基本要素提供了依据。它探讨了在“哥伦比亚计划”的设计阶段为美国霸权做出贡献的哥伦比亚代理机构，而埃沃·莫拉莱斯（Evo Morales）总统领导下的玻利维亚代理机构则面临挑战。在这两种情况下，都是美国而不是拉丁美洲的国家承担了被动角色，而将主动权留给了哥伦比亚和玻利维亚。因此，本文不是重申主动的单向美国霸权与被动的从属国家，而是建议理解这两种情况，以证明从属国家机构在霸权体系配置中的重要性。