In the past decade, private equity sponsors have taken a more aggressive stance against creditors of their portfolio companies, the most recent iteration of which has come in the form of collateral stripping. Sponsors have been using creative lawyering to transfer valuable collateral out of the reach of creditors. This Article delves deeper into the issue by examining the contract terms and litigation claims raised by these transactions. The lack of protective covenants and ease of manipulating EBITDA and asset valuations are key conditions that permit collateral stripping. Each of these conditions were present in the past decade, primarily due to the protracted expansionary stage of the credit cycle. Lenders, however, can protect themselves from collateral stripping by negotiating stricter covenants and tighter EBITDA definitions, as well as pursuing ex post litigation for fraudulent transfers, illegal distributions, and claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Contractual opportunism and creative lawyering will almost certainly continue to pervade credit markets. This Article provides a roadmap of ways that lenders can protect themselves from opportunism during contracting and throughout the course of the loan. As this Article concludes, ex post litigation claims are often an inadequate remedy, so lenders should seek to tighten EBITDA definitions and broaden protective covenants—even if to do so requires other concessions—to avoid litigation.

中文翻译：

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陷入困境的借款人抵押品剥离的发展

在过去十年中，私募股权发起人对其投资组合公司的债权人采取了更加激进的立场，最近一次是以剥离抵押品的形式出现的。保荐人一直在使用创造性的律师方法将有价值的抵押品转移到债权人无法触及的地方。本文通过审查这些交易引发的合同条款和诉讼请求来更深入地探讨这个问题。缺乏保护性契约以及易于操纵 EBITDA 和资产估值是允许剥离抵押品的关键条件。这些情况中的每一种都在过去十年中出现，主要是由于信贷周期的长期扩张阶段。然而，贷款人可以通过谈判更严格的契约和更严格的 EBITDA 定义来保护自己免受抵押品剥离，以及对欺诈性转让、非法分配和违反信托义务的索赔进行事后诉讼。契约机会主义和创造性律师几乎肯定会继续遍及信贷市场。本文提供了贷款人在签订合同期间和整个贷款过程中保护自己免受机会主义影响的方式路线图。正如本文总结的那样，事后诉讼索赔通常是一种不充分的补救措施，因此贷方应寻求收紧 EBITDA 定义并扩大保护性契约——即使这样做需要其他让步——以避免诉讼。本文提供了贷款人在签订合同期间和整个贷款过程中保护自己免受机会主义影响的方式路线图。正如本文总结的那样，事后诉讼索赔通常是一种不充分的补救措施，因此贷方应寻求收紧 EBITDA 定义并扩大保护性契约——即使这样做需要其他让步——以避免诉讼。本文提供了贷款人在签订合同期间和整个贷款过程中保护自己免受机会主义影响的方式路线图。正如本文总结的那样，事后诉讼索赔通常是一种不充分的补救措施，因此贷方应寻求收紧 EBITDA 定义并扩大保护性契约——即使这样做需要其他让步——以避免诉讼。