Commonsense morality seems to feature both agent-neutral and agent-relative elements. For a long time, the core debate between consequentialists and deontologists was which of these features should take centerstage. With the introduction of the consequentializing project and agent-relative value, however, agent-neutrality has been left behind. While I likewise favor an agent-relative view, agent-neutral views capture important features of commonsense morality.This article investigates whether an agent-relative view can maintain what is attractive about typical agent-neutral views. In particular, I argue that the agent-relative reasons-wielding deontologist is ultimately able to capture those features ordinarily associated with agent-neutral views, while the agent-relative value wielding consequentialist is left with a dilemma. The consequentializer either succumbs to the concerns of her agent-neutral opponents or else abandons the distinctive and attractive features of her view. Either way, I conclude that agent-relative value is best left behind.

中文翻译：

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留下代理相对价值

常识道德似乎同时具有代理中立和代理相关的元素。长期以来，后果论者和义务论者之间的核心争论是这些特征中的哪一个应该占据中心位置。然而，随着结果化项目和代理相对价值的引入，代理中立性被抛在了后面。虽然我同样赞成代理人相对观点，但代理人中立观点抓住了常识道德的重要特征。本文研究代理人相对观点是否可以保持典型代理人中立观点的吸引力。特别是，我认为，使用代理相对原因的义务论者最终能够捕捉到通常与代理中立观点相关的那些特征，而使用结果论者的代理相对价值则面临两难境地。结果者要么屈服于她的代理人中立对手的担忧，要么放弃她观点的独特和有吸引力的特征。无论哪种方式，我的结论是最好将代理相对价值抛在后面。