Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it.

中文翻译：

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没有理想化和适应性偏好的主观主义

关于幸福的主观主义认为，一个对象在一定程度上对一个人的幸福有贡献，即一个人在某些条件下对这个对象有一种支持的态度。大多数主观主义者认为这些条件应该是理想的。支持这一观点的一个原因是，当人们将他们的支持态度适应压迫的情况时，他们可能获得的幸福水平就会降低。尽管如此，我首先认为，诉诸理想化的自治条件或任何其他条件来消除或取代适应性的亲态度是错误的。其次，我表明，不诉诸任何这种理想化条件的最自然的主观主义版本可以解释为什么具有适应性支持态度的人的福祉不应局限于实现这些支持态度。总共，