The Relevance View, exemplified by Alex Voorhoeve's Aggregate Relevant Claims, has considerable appeal. It accommodates our reluctance to aggregate weak claims in canonical cases like Life for Headaches (where one person's claim to life-saving treatment competes with millions of claims for headache relief), while permitting aggregation of claims in a range of other cases. But it has been the target of significant criticism. In an important recent paper, Patrick Tomlin argues that the view suffers from failures of internal logic, violating plausible consistency constraints and generating incoherent combinations of verdicts on cases. And in cases resembling real-world healthcare allocation problems, Tomlin argues that the view offers no guidance at all. In response, I argue that the internal logic of the Relevance View is sound, and the view's core principles, suitably clarified, support a significant extension of the view beyond the simple cases to which it is typically applied.

中文翻译：

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相关性观点：辩护和扩展

以 Alex Voorhoeve 的 Aggregate Relevant Claims 为例的 Relevance View 具有相当大的吸引力。它适应了我们不愿在诸如 Life for Headaches 等典型案例中汇总弱索赔（其中一个人对挽救生命的治疗的索赔与数百万项缓解头痛的索赔竞争），同时允许在一系列其他案例中汇总索赔。但它一直是重大批评的目标。在最近的一篇重要论文中，帕特里克·汤姆林认为，这种观点存在内部逻辑的失败，违反了合理的一致性约束，并在案例中产生了不连贯的判决组合。在类似于现实世界医疗保健分配问题的情况下，汤姆林认为这种观点根本没有提供任何指导。作为回应，我认为相关视图的内部逻辑是合理的，