In a well-known paper, Nick Bostrom presents a confrontation between a fictionalised Blaise Pascal and a mysterious mugger. The mugger persuades Pascal to hand over his wallet by exploiting Pascal's commitment to expected utility maximisation. He does so by offering Pascal an astronomically high reward such that, despite Pascal's low credence in the mugger's truthfulness, the expected utility of accepting the mugging is higher than rejecting it. In this article, I present another sort of high value, low credence mugging. This time, the mugger utilises research on existential risk and the long-term potential of humanity to exploit Pascal's expected-utility-maximising descendant. This mugging is more insidious than Bostrom's original as it relies on plausible facts about the long-term future, as well as realistic credences about how our everyday actions could, albeit with infinitesimally low likelihood, affect the future of humanity.

中文翻译：

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帕斯卡的抢劫犯再次出击

在一篇著名的论文中，尼克博斯特罗姆呈现了一个虚构的布莱斯帕斯卡和一个神秘的抢劫犯之间的对抗。抢劫犯利用帕斯卡对预期效用最大化的承诺，说服帕斯卡交出他的钱包。他通过向帕斯卡提供天文数字般的高额奖励来做到这一点，尽管帕斯卡对抢劫犯的真实性的信任度很低，但接受抢劫的预期效用高于拒绝抢劫。在本文中，我介绍了另一种高价值、低可信度的抢劫。这一次，抢劫犯利用对生存风险和人类长期潜力的研究来利用帕斯卡的预期效用最大化后代。这种抢劫比博斯特罗姆的原作更阴险，因为它依赖于关于长期未来的合理事实，