This article advocates employing John Stuart Mill's harm principle to set the boundary for unregulated free speech, and his Greatest Happiness Principle to regulate speech outside that boundary because it threatens unconsented-to harm. Supplementing the harm principle with an offense principle is unnecessary and undesirable if our conception of harm integrates recent empirical evidence unavailable to Mill. For example, current research uncovers the tangible harms individuals suffer directly from bigoted speech, as well as the indirect harms generated by the systemic oppression and epistemic injustice that bigoted speech constructs and reinforces. Using Mill's ethical framework with an updated notion of harm, we can conclude that social coercion is not justified to restrict any harmless speech, no matter how offensive. Yet certain forms of speech, such as bigoted insults, are both harmful and fail to express a genuine opinion, and so do not deserve free speech protection.

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John Stuart Mill 的危害原则和言论自由：扩展危害的概念

本文主张采用约翰·斯图尔特·米尔的危害原则来设定不受监管的界限自由言论，以及他的最大幸福原则来规范该边界之外的言论，因为它威胁到未经同意的伤害。如果我们的伤害概念整合了密尔无法获得的最新经验证据，那么用冒犯原则补充伤害原则是不必要和不可取的。例如，目前的研究揭示了偏执言论直接对个人造成的有形伤害，以及偏执言论构建和强化的系统性压迫和认知不公正所产生的间接伤害。使用米尔的道德框架和更新的伤害概念，我们可以得出结论，社会胁迫没有理由限制任何无害的言论，无论多么令人反感. 然而，某些语言形式，例如粗暴的辱骂，都是有害的和没有表达真实的意见，因此不值得言论自由保护。