This paper argues that open-mindedness is a corrective virtue. It serves as a corrective to the epistemic vice of confirmation bias. Specifically, open-mindedness is the epistemically virtuous disposition to resist the negative effects of confirmation bias on our ability to reason well and to evaluate evidence and arguments. As part of the defense and presentation of our account, we explore four discussions of open-mindedness in the recent literature. All four approaches have strengths and shed light on aspects of the virtue of open-mindedness. Each mentions various symptoms of confirmation bias and some explore aspects of the corrective role of open-mindedness. However, ours is the first to explicitly identify open-mindedness as a corrective virtue to the specific epistemic vice of confirmation bias. We show how the corrective account also permits a response to the concern that open-mindedness might not actually count as a virtue.

中文翻译：

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思想开放是一种矫正美德

本文认为，思想开放是一种矫正美德。它可以纠正确认偏差的认知缺陷。具体来说，思想开放是一种认知上的美德倾向，可以抵制确认偏见对我们进行良好推理以及评估证据和论点的能力的负面影响。作为我们叙述的辩护和陈述的一部分，我们探讨了最近文献中关于思想开放的四个讨论。所有四种方法都具有优势，并阐明了思想开放的美德的各个方面。每篇文章都提到了确认偏见的各种症状，有些则探讨了思想开放的纠正作用的各个方面。然而，我们是第一个明确地将思想开放作为对确认偏见这一特定认知缺陷的纠正美德的人。