For an agent to be motivated by a normatively perverse reason is to be motivated by a normative or evaluative thought as such which, if true, would count as such against the action that it motivates the agent to perform, or against the attitude that it motivates the agent to take. For example, that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad counts, as such, against performing the action. When the thought that an action is morally wrong or prudentially bad (bad for me) motivates me as such to perform the action, my motivating reason is normatively perverse. If being motivated by normatively perverse reasons is possible, then what, if anything, is wrong about it? I present and reject some accounts of what may be wrong about normative perversity (wrong reasons, malfunctioning attitudes, practical irrationality, instability, evaluative ignorance). In the course of this discussion some desiderata emerge. Then I defend the suggestion that normative perversion is socially undesirable, in that it undermines certain valuable interpersonal and intrapersonal relations. Entering and maintaining these relations is constitutive of valuing people as beings to whom reasonable justification is owed. I show how this account satisfies the desiderata.

中文翻译：

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反常的原因

对于一个行为人来说，被一个规范的反常理由所激励就是被一个规范性或评估性的想法所激励，如果这些想法是真的，就会被认为是反对它激励代理人执行的行动，或者反对它激励的态度要采取的代理。例如，一个行为在道德上是错误的或在审慎上是错误的，因此不利于执行该行为。当一个行为在道德上是错误的或在审慎上是坏的（对我不利）的想法促使我这样做时，我的动机理由通常是反常的。如果被规范的不正当理由驱使是可能的，那么它有什么问题（如果有的话）？我提出并拒绝一些关于规范性反常可能有问题的解释（错误的原因、错误的态度、实际的非理性、不稳定、评估无知）。在这个讨论的过程中，一些需要的东西出现了。然后我捍卫规范性倒错在社会上是不受欢迎的建议，因为它破坏了某些有价值的人际关系和人际关系。进入和维持这些关系构成了将人视为应有合理理由的存在。我展示了这个帐户如何满足需求。