According to a recent wave of work by legal anti-positivists, legal norms are a subset of moral norms. This striking “one-system” view of law has rapidly become the dominant form of anti-positivism, but its implications have so far been little tested. This article argues that the one-system view leads systematically to untenable conclusions about what legal rights and obligations we have. For many clear legal norms, the view lacks the resources to explain the existence of corresponding moral norms. And its criteria for distinguishing legal norms within morality imply an under- or over-inclusive set of legal norms. I stress the special difficulties that apply beyond obligations, in the case of privileges and powers, and I show that the view's problems do not only—or mainly—concern egregiously unjust law, or indeed morally defective law at all. I close with reflections on legal normativity and the prospects for different forms of anti-positivism.

中文翻译：

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新的法律反实证主义

根据法律反实证主义者最近的工作浪潮，法律规范是道德规范的一个子集。这种引人注目的“单一系统”法律观已迅速成为反实证主义的主要形式，但其影响迄今尚未得到充分检验。本文认为，单一系统的观点系统地导致了关于我们拥有哪些法律权利和义务的站不住脚的结论。对于许多明确的法律规范，该观点缺乏资源来解释相应道德规范的存在。它在道德范围内区分法律规范的标准意味着一套包容性不足或过度包容的法律规范。我强调在特权和权力的情况下适用于义务之外的特殊困难，并且我表明，该观点的问题不仅或主要涉及极其不公正的法律，或者根本就没有道德缺陷的法律。