This essay builds upon Rebecca Kukla's constructive treatment of Dennettian stances as embodied coping strategies, to extend a conversation previously initiated by John Haugeland about Daniel Dennett on stances and real patterns and Martin Heidegger on the ontological difference. This comparison is mutually illuminating. It advances three underdeveloped issues in Heidegger: Dasein's ‘bodily nature’, the import of Heidegger's ontological pluralism for object identity, and how clarification of the sense of being in general bears on the manifold senses of being. It more sharply differentiates Kukla's and Dennett's understandings of stances and the real. Finally, it allows for further development of Kukla's account of Dennettian stances as embodied. These developments show greater complexity than what Kukla calls ‘the wide and counterfactually flexible repertoire of bodily positions’ that make up an embodied stance. They also show how different stances are compared and assessed even though Kukla rightly denies the possibility of a normative or explanatory philosophical ‘meta-stance’.

中文翻译：

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立场与存在

本文建立在丽贝卡·库克拉对丹尼特式立场作为具体应对策略的建设性处理的基础上，以扩展约翰·豪格兰先前发起的关于丹尼尔·丹尼特关于立场和真实模式以及马丁·海德格尔关于本体论差异的对话。这种比较是相互启发的。它提出了海德格尔的三个欠发达的问题：此在的“身体本性”、海德格尔本体论多元论对客体同一性的重要性，以及对一般存在感的澄清如何影响存在的多样性。它更清晰地区分了库克拉和丹尼特对姿态和现实的理解。最后，它允许进一步发展库克拉对所体现的丹尼特立场的描述。这些发展显示出比 Kukla 所称的构成具身姿势的“广泛且反事实灵活的身体姿势曲目”更为复杂。它们还展示了如何比较和评估不同的立场，尽管库克拉正确地否认了规范性或解释性哲学“元立场”的可能性。