This paper studies retirement and child support policies in a small, open, overlapping-generations economy with PAYG social security and endogenous retirement and fertility decisions. It demonstrates that neither fertility nor retirement choices necessarily coincide with socially optimal allocation, because agents do not take into account the externalities of fertility and the elderly labor supply in the economy as a whole. It shows that governments can realize the first-best allocation by introducing a child allowance scheme and a subsidy to incentivize the labor supply of older workers. As an alternative to subsidizing the elderly labor supply, we show that the first-best allocation can also be achieved by controlling the retirement age. Finally, the model is simulated in order to study whether the policies devoted to realizing the social optimum in a market economy could be a Pareto improvement.

本文研究了具有 PAYG 社会保障和内生退休和生育决策的小型、开放、代际重叠经济中的退休和儿童支持政策。它表明，生育和退休选择都不一定与社会最优分配相一致，因为代理人没有考虑生育的外部性和整个经济中的老年人劳动力供应。它表明，政府可以通过引入儿童津贴计划和补贴来激励老年工人的劳动力供应，从而实现优先分配。作为补贴老年劳动力供给的替代方案，我们表明通过控制退休年龄也可以实现最优分配。最后，