This article analyses the reasons why most Latin American governments frequently defaulted on their debts during the nineteenth century. Contrary to previous works, which focused on domestic factors, I argue that supply-side factors were equally important. The regulatory framework at the London Stock Exchange prevented defaulting governments from having access to the capital market. Therefore, the implicit incentive for underwriting banks and governments was to accelerate negotiations with bondholders, particularly during periods of high liquidity. Frequently, however, settlements were short-lived. In contrast, certain merchant banks opted to delay or refuse a settlement if they judged that the risk of a renewed default was too high. In such cases, even if negotiations were extended, the final agreements were more often respected, allowing governments to improve their repayment record.

中文翻译：

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解释拉丁美洲的持续违约：对 1822-1914 年伦敦的债权人关系的分析

本文分析了大多数拉丁美洲政府在 19 世纪经常拖欠债务的原因。与之前关注国内因素的研究相反，我认为供给侧因素同样重要。伦敦证券交易所的监管框架阻止违约政府进入资本市场。因此，承销银行和政府的隐含动机是加快与债券持有人的谈判，尤其是在流动性高的时期。然而，定居点经常是短暂的。相比之下，如果某些商业银行认为再次违约的风险太高，他们会选择延迟或拒绝和解。在这种情况下，即使延长谈判，最终协议也更经常得到尊重，