This contribution evaluates whether European Union State aid policy could play a role in achieving deeper and more solidary integration in the area of public health. According to Article 107 TFEU, the powers of Member States to grant aid to help their economies are seriously limited. Exceptions to the general prohibition to grant State aid are authorised by the European Commission, which enjoys wide discretion in weighing national objectives against European integration goals. The area of public health has been shielded from the application of these rules, with activities such as the provision of health insurance failing to be considered of economic nature (see most recently the Dôvera judgment). The COVID-19 experience shows that, in cases of major health crises, State aid provisions are practically suspended, with interventions allowed in the name of the fight against the pandemic. The eventual creation of a Health Union will require the re-evaluation of the application of the State aid rules to healthcare. This paper questions whether these rules should evolve as a reflective function of strengthened competences in healthcare or whether existing regulatory powers are enough to determine the interaction between national spending policies, a solidary European Health Union and fair competition.

中文翻译：

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欧盟卫生联盟和国家援助政策：权力越大责任越大

该贡献评估了欧盟国家援助政策是否可以在公共卫生领域实现更深入和更团结的整合方面发挥作用。根据 TFEU 第 107 条，成员国提供援助以帮助其经济的权力受到严重限制。欧盟委员会批准了一般禁止给予国家援助的例外情况，该委员会在权衡国家目标与欧洲一体化目标时享有广泛的自由裁量权。公共卫生领域不受这些规则的适用，诸如提供健康保险之类的活动没有被视为经济性质（参见最近的 Dôvera 判决）。COVID-19 的经验表明，在发生重大健康危机的情况下，国家援助条款实际上被暂停，以抗击大流行的名义允许干预。最终建立卫生联盟将需要重新评估国家援助规则在医疗保健中的应用。本文质疑这些规则是否应该作为增强医疗保健能力的反映功能而发展，或者现有的监管权力是否足以确定国家支出政策、团结的欧洲卫生联盟和公平竞争之间的相互作用。