While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.

中文翻译：

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国家、公司和安全：私人行为者如何实施制裁，从荷兰汲取的经验教训

虽然联合国安理会、欧盟和美国目前的做法在大多数情况下倾向于仅实施有针对性的制裁，但私人行为者经常抱怨无法在国家处理金融交易、运输货物或提供服务制裁目标所在的地方。由于制裁是由营利性行为者实施的，制裁的影响最终往往是广泛的和不分青红皂白的。本文探讨营利性行为者如何与实施制裁相关，他们如何在决策中反映这些行为，以及他们如何与公共当局互动。我们的研究结果表明，营利性行为者（可能除外最大的跨国公司）在实施制裁之前不会与公共当局接触。营利行为者在实施阶段的行为符合公司和企业作为利润最大化者的假设。权衡业务利润与（不）合规成本，并做出他们认为最大化利润的决策。事实上，由于联合国、欧盟和美国实施的多重和重叠制裁制度产生的不确定性，降低风险似乎是这些公司最常用的方法。