In this paper, we argue that the popular claim that laws of nature explain their instances (explanatory laws) creates a philosophical puzzle when it is combined with the widely held requirement that explanations need to be underpinned by ‘wordly’ relations (explanatory realism). We argue that a “direct solution” to the puzzle that accounts for both explanatory laws and explanatory realism requires endorsing at least a radical metaphysics. Then, we examine the ramifications of a “skeptical solution”, i.e., dissolving it by giving up at least one of these two claims, and argue that adopting it is more favorable to Humean reductionists than to anti-reductionists about laws of nature.

在本文中，我们认为，当人们普遍认为自然法则解释其实例（解释性法则）时，就会引起哲学上的困惑，因为它与人们普遍认为的解释需要以``文字''关系（解释性现实主义）为基础的要求相结合。我们认为，要想同时解决解释性法律和解释性现实主义的难题，就必须至少认可一种激进的形而上学。然后，我们研究了“怀疑的解决方案”的后果，即通过放弃这两个主张中的至少一项来解决它，并认为采用它对Humean还原论者比对自然法则的反还原论者更为有利。