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Power, institutions and rents in two South African cities
Area Development and Policy Pub Date : 2020-09-14 , DOI: 10.1080/23792949.2020.1793680
Crispian Olver

ABSTRACT

Through case studies of two South African metropolitan municipalities, Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay, the paper explores the way in which the economic advantages at the disposal of local government, referred to as rents, are distributed according to the power relations in cities. The city governance regimes are distinguished in the way that power is structured, the balance between formal and informal institutions, the nature of the rents allocated, and their developmental and spatial outcomes. Cape Town’s growth-oriented model, founded on intimate relationships between developers and the political elite, exercised centralized control over land rights, which were allocated to entrenched property interests. The weaker clientelist regime in Nelson Mandela Bay relied on a diminishing pool of procurement rents to sustain a decentralized patronage-based system. The paper uses a political settlements framework to understand how the configuration of power in each city is sustained by a particular distribution of rents, mobilized through informal institutions, which in turn impact the structuring of the bureaucracy. The spatial and developmental impacts of the case studies indicate that despite the better development outcomes of Cape Town, neither regime specifically advantages the urban poor. The paper concludes by suggesting ways in which political settlements theory can better account for bureaucratic autonomy and impacts on the space economy.



中文翻译:

南非两个城市的电力、机构和租金

摘要

通过对南非两个大都市开普敦和纳尔逊曼德拉湾的案例研究,本文探讨了地方政府可支配的经济优势(称为租金)根据城市权力关系分配的方式。城市治理制度的区别在于权力的构建方式、正式和非正式机构之间的平衡、分配的租金的性质以及它们的发展和空间结果。开普敦以发展为导向的模式建立在开发商和政治精英之间的密切关系之上,对分配给根深蒂固的财产利益的土地权利实行集中控制。纳尔逊曼德拉湾较弱的客户制度依赖于不断减少的采购租金池来维持分散的基于赞助的系统。本文使用政治定居点框架来理解每个城市的权力配置如何通过特定的租金分配来维持,通过非正式机构动员,这反过来又影响官僚机构的结构。案例研究的空间和发展影响表明,尽管开普敦的发展成果更好,但两种制度都没有特别有利于城市贫民。本文最后提出了政治解决理论可以更好地解释官僚自治和对太空经济影响的方法。本文使用政治定居点框架来理解每个城市的权力配置如何通过特定的租金分配来维持,通过非正式机构动员,这反过来又影响官僚机构的结构。案例研究的空间和发展影响表明,尽管开普敦的发展成果更好,但两种制度都没有特别有利于城市贫民。本文最后提出了政治解决理论可以更好地解释官僚自治和对太空经济影响的方法。本文使用政治定居点框架来理解每个城市的权力配置如何通过特定的租金分配来维持,通过非正式机构动员,这反过来又影响官僚机构的结构。案例研究的空间和发展影响表明,尽管开普敦的发展成果更好,但两种制度都没有特别有利于城市贫民。本文最后提出了政治解决理论可以更好地解释官僚自治和对太空经济影响的方法。案例研究的空间和发展影响表明,尽管开普敦的发展成果更好,但两种制度都没有特别有利于城市贫民。本文最后提出了政治解决理论可以更好地解释官僚自治和对太空经济影响的方法。案例研究的空间和发展影响表明,尽管开普敦的发展成果更好,但两种制度都没有特别有利于城市贫民。本文最后提出了政治解决理论可以更好地解释官僚自治和对太空经济影响的方法。

更新日期:2020-09-14
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