In the modern moral luck debate, Kant is standardly taken to be the enemy of moral luck. My goal in this paper is to show that this is mistaken. The paper is divided into six sections. In the first, I show that participants in the moral luck literature take moral luck to be anathema to Kantian ethics. In the second, I explain the kind of luck I am going to focus on here: consequence luck, a species of resultant luck. In the third, I explain why philosophers have taken Kantian ethics to reject moral luck and, in particular, consequence luck. In the fourth, I explain why these philosophers are mistaken, and I set out Kant’s theoretical framework for consequence luck. In the fifth, I clarify and defend this framework, and in the sixth, I interrogate and attack it.

在现代道德运气辩论中，康德通常被视为道德运气的敌人。我在本文中的目的是证明这是错误的。本文分为六个部分。首先，我表明道德运气文学的参与者将道德运气视为对康德伦理学的厌恶。在第二部分中，我将解释我将在这里重点介绍的运气：后果运气，一种由此产生的运气。在第三篇中，我解释了为什么哲学家采用康德伦理来拒绝道德运气，特别是后果运气。在第四部分中，我解释了为什么这些哲学家会误解，并提出了康德的结果运气的理论框架。在第五部分中，我阐明并捍卫了该框架，在第六部分中，我提出了质疑和攻击。