Theorizing about children’s early development is beset with interpretational complexities. I argue that there is a general tendency to over-interpret the experimental findings, and that one of the main causes of this is the difficulty of disengaging from our adult frame of reference when theorizing about the young child’s mind. One domain where this holds is children’s ability to differentiate themselves from others. In relation to this I first critically analyze some cases of interpretational complexities, and then apply my methodological and conceptual concerns to children’s perspective-taking abilities. This has a specific bearing on the classical false-belief task, which is a perspective-taking task. Part II proposes a new, what I call, a ‘Piagetian reading’ of the false-belief test. My new interpretation of the test suggests two different ways of perspective-taking of which one is egocentric in Piaget’s sense. Concluding Part III elaborates on some implications of the proposed reading of the test for a number of findings in the Theory-of-Mind field.

关于儿童早期发育的理论上充斥着解释的复杂性。我认为，普遍存在过度解释实验结果的趋势，这的主要原因之一是，在对幼儿的心理进行理论分析时，很难脱离我们的成人参考框架。这方面的一个条件是孩子有能力与其他人区分开。与此相关，我首先批判性地分析了一些解释复杂性的案例，然后将我的方法论和概念问题应用于儿童的观点理解能力。这与经典的虚假信念任务有特殊的关系，这是一个需要采取观点的任务。第二部分提出了错误信念测试的新的所谓的“伯爵式读物”，我称之为“ Piagetian阅读”。我对测试的新诠释提出了两种不同的视角获取方式，其中一种在伯爵看来是以自我为中心的。第三部分的结尾部分详细阐述了拟议的测验对心智理论领域中许多发现的启示。