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Identity as institution: power, agency, and the self
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2020-11-02 , DOI: 10.1007/s11097-020-09707-w
Scott Marratto

This paper addresses issues of agency and self-identity on the basis of a phenomenology of embodiment. It considers a tension in accounts of embodiment between, on the one hand, the body as the locus of subjectivity, lived experience, and agency, and, on the other hand, the body as constructed, as the site where discursive regimes of power are inscribed. In exploring this tension I consider Frantz Fanon’s and Sarah Ahmed’s phenomenological accounts of racism to illustrate the ways in which social power and violence come to be implicated in these conflicts within our embodied identities. I also consider Foucauldian “power” in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “institution.” I argue that only the phenomenological concept of institution, by drawing our attention to the ambiguities of lived embodiment, succeeds in offering us resources for thinking about the interplay between passivity and agency in the life of the subject, and, in particular, about a form of agency not wholly reducible to the effects of power.



中文翻译:

作为制度的身份:权力,代理和自我

本文基于体现的现象学来探讨代理和自我认同的问题。它考虑到体现的张力,一方面是身体作为主观性,生活经验和代理的场所,另一方面是所构造的身体是权力的话语权所在的场所。题字。在探讨这种张力时,我考虑了弗朗茨·法农(Frantz Fanon)和莎拉·艾哈迈德(Sarah Ahmed)对种族主义的现象学解释,以说明社会在我们所体现的身份中,这些冲突牵涉到力量和暴力。我还考虑了福柯的“权力”与梅洛-庞蒂的“制度”概念有关。我认为,只有制度的现象学概念,通过引起我们对活生生的体现的模糊性的关注,才能成功地为我们提供资源,用于思考主体生活中的消极与代理之间的相互作用,尤其是形式上的相互作用。不能完全还原为权力影响的代理权。

更新日期:2020-11-02
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