Light is the most important (if not the only) analogy for the Vijnānavādin in proving self-awareness (svasaṃvedana), namely the cognition that cognizes itself. Recent studies show that two opponents of the doctrine of self-awareness, Kumārila (ca. 530–600) and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (ca. 850–910) alleged that the Vijnānavādin has also used light as an analogy for the view that cognition must be perceived before the object is perceived. However, this is a modification of the actual view of the Vijnānavāda that cognition must be perceived in order for it to perceive its object. Based on Kumārila’s such modified restatement, Taber argues that “Kumārila’s Buddhist” fails to establish the light as a valid analogy in their theory. Taber’s argument is subsequently referred to by Watson and Kataoka in their works, in which they defend Vijnānavāda’s light-analogy against Taber. However, their defence is also based on a similarly modified restatement by Jayanta and the defence is set out in the view of Naiyāyika philosophy. This paper examines all these arguments and shows that Watson’s and Kataoka’s thought of the light-analogy might still be problematic. It also goes back to the original view of the Vijnānavāda and observes to what extent the light-analogy serves as a strong support for the establishment of the self-awareness.

中文翻译：

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在 Vijñānavāda 中，光作为认知的类比

光是 Vijnānavādin 证明自我意识（svasaṃvedana）的最重要（如果不是唯一的话）类比，即认知自身的认知。最近的研究表明，自我意识学说的两个反对者，Kumārila（约 530-600 年）和 Bhaṭṭa Jayanta（约 850-910 年）声称 Vijnānavādin 也使用光作为类比，认为认知必须是在物体被感知之前被感知。然而，这是对 Vijnānavāda 的实际观点的修改，即必须感知认知才能感知其对象。基于库玛瑞拉的这种修改后的重述，泰伯认为“库玛瑞拉的佛教徒”未能在他们的理论中将光确立为有效的类比。泰伯的论点随后被沃森和片冈在他们的作品中引用，他们在其中捍卫 Vijnānavāda 对泰伯的光类比。然而，他们的辩护也是基于 Jayanta 的类似修改的重述，并且辩护是根据 Naiyāyika 哲学提出的。本文检验了所有这些论点，并表明沃森和片冈的光类比思想可能仍然存在问题。它还回到了唯识论的原始观点，并观察了光的类比在多大程度上为建立自我意识提供了强有力的支持。