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Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself
Journal of Indian Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-11-01 , DOI: 10.1007/s10781-020-09446-x
Alex Watson

The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jnātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī (c. 890 CE), ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming.

中文翻译:

关于自我知见的四种弥摩沙见

这篇文章涉及中世纪印度的一场辩论,即我们是否以及如何知道存在自我(ātman),这里将其理解为超越个体认知的认知主体(jnātṛ),是它们的共同基础。审查了尚未从梵文翻译成欧洲语言的一段话,来自 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 的 Nyāyamanjarī(公元 890 年),“推理之花”。这段丰富的文章揭示了一些在次要文献中还没有注意到的东西,即 Mīmāṃsakas 提出了四种不同的自我认知时发生的模型。文章阐明了四者之间的区别,以及它们之间的历史和逻辑关系。它还假设构成需要创建新观点的压力,即早期观点的感知问题,
更新日期:2020-11-01
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