Although the doctrine of divine simplicity has faced substantial criticism in recent years, Jeffrey Brower has recently offered a novel defense of the view by appealing to contemporary truthmaker theory. In this paper, I will argue that Brower’s defense of divine simplicity requires an implausible account of how truthmaking works for essential intrinsic predications. I will first argue that, unless Brower is willing to make an ad hoc exception for how truthmaking works in God’s case, he is committed to saying that essential intrinsic predications about any object are made true by that object alone, not by its having essential properties. I will then argue that reflecting on cases where distinct essential intrinsic predications about an object have different causal explanations behind them shows that this general view of truthmaking is implausible.

尽管近年来，关于神圣朴素的学说遭到了广泛的批评，但杰弗里·布劳（Jeffrey Brower）最近通过诉诸当代真理制造者理论，为这一观点提供了新颖的辩护。在本文中，我将争辩说，布劳尔捍卫神圣的朴素性要求对真相如何对基本内在谓词起作用的说法难以置信。我首先要指出的是，除非布罗尔愿意为真相在上帝的案子中如何作特设例外，否则他将致力于说关于任何事情的基本内在前提一个对象只能由该对象实现，而不是由其具有必需的属性来实现。然后，我将争辩说，反思关于一个对象的不同本质内在谓语在其背后有不同的因果解释的情况表明，这种普遍的真理解释观点是不可信的。