Metasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions of combining inferentialism and deflationism are easy to see, deflationism is also a controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain that truth is an insubstantive property, but it is not altogether clear what an insubstantive property is. Secondly, as deflationists maintain that truth does not play an explanatory role, it is incompatible with the position that truth can explain the normativity of truth talk. Given that deflationism faces these objections, it would be preferable if the success of inferentialism did not depend on the deflationist’s ability to respond to these objections. I argue that someone attracted to inferentialism for its ability to accommodate antirealist intuitions about a domain (e.g. morality) is not committed to deflationism about truth. More specifically, I will show that inferentialism combined with a straightforward account of inferentialist truth-conditions is compatible with a version of truth pluralism. I call this position Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.

元语义推论在过去的几十年中已经流行起来。传统上，推论主义与对诸如真相和指称等语义术语的通缩态度相结合，即，许多推论主义者认为，当我们使用这些语义术语时，我们并不意图指代实质属性。这种结合使推论主义对自认为是反现实主义者的哲学家具有吸引力。尽管容易看到将推论和通缩结合在一起的吸引力，但通缩还是一个有争议的立场。首先，通货紧缩主义者坚持认为真理是一种非实质性财产，但尚不清楚什么是非实质性财产。其次，由于通货紧缩主义者坚持认为真相不具有解释作用，因此与真相可以解释真相话语规范性的立场是不相容的。鉴于通货紧缩面临着这些反对意见，如果推论主义的成功不取决于通缩主义者应对这些反对意见的能力，那将是可取的。我认为，有人因推理能力适应领域的反现实主义直觉（例如道德）而被推论所吸引，但他并没有致力于对真理的通缩。更具体地说，我将证明，推论主义与对推论主义真理条件的直接描述相结合，与真理多元主义的版本兼容。我称这个立场为推论真理真理论。我认为，有人因推理能力适应领域的反现实主义直觉（例如道德）而被推论所吸引，但他并没有致力于对真理的通缩。更具体地说，我将证明，推论主义与对推论主义真理条件的直接描述相结合，与真理多元主义的版本兼容。我称这个立场为推论真理真理论。我认为，有人因推理能力适应领域的反现实主义直觉（例如道德）而被推论所吸引，但他并没有致力于对真理的通缩。更具体地说，我将证明，推论主义与对推论主义真理条件的直接描述相结合，与真理多元主义的版本兼容。我称这个立场为推论真理真理论。