There has recently been a revived interest in temporal justice among political philosophers. For example, lone mothers have, on average, 30 h less free time per week than people in couples without children. Recent work has focussed on free time as a distinct distributive good, but this paper argues that it would be a mistake for a theory of temporal justice to focus only on shares of free time. First, I argue that the concept of free time does not succeed in tracking discretionary control over time. All of time is a resource, and the particular moral relevance of free time must be established otherwise. Second, hours of time differ in use value, and we cannot fully track our concerns about the allocation of time, whether free or necessary, without taking this into account. We care about free time but also about ‘quality (of) time’. To explain this observation, I develop an account of the value of time as a resource. The value of time periods differs with the prospects for which a time period can be used, that is, what we can do and be with it. What we are allocating when we are allocating time is not just hours; it is hours of time with a certain value. Finally, I argue that a concern for the value of time is compatible with a resourcist theory of temporal justice.

最近，政治哲学家对时间正义重新产生了兴趣。例如，与没有孩子的夫妻相比，单身母亲平均每周有30小时的空闲时间减少。近期的工作集中于将空闲时间作为一种独特的分配产品，但本文认为，时间正义理论只关注空闲时间的份额是错误的。首先，我认为空闲时间的概念不能成功地追踪随时间的自由控制。所有时间都是一种资源，闲暇时间在道德上的特殊意义必须确立。其次，时间的使用价值各不相同，如果不考虑这一点，我们将无法完全跟踪我们对时间分配（无论是免费还是必要的）的担忧。我们关心的是业余时间，也关心“时间的质量”。为了解释这种观察，我对时间作为一种资源的价值进行了说明。时间段的价值因可以使用时间段的前景而异，也就是说，我们可以做并与之相处。当我们分配时间时，我们分配的不仅仅是数小时。几个小时有一定价值的时间。最后，我认为对时间价值的关注与时间正义的资源理论是相容的。