DECISION Pub Date : 2021-01-27 , DOI: 10.1007/s40622-020-00267-1 Indranil Biswas , Arnab Adhikari , Baidyanath Biswas
In the age of rapid technological advancement and digitization, coordination strategy remains an important issue for the supply chain. Additionally, the uncertainty caused by the disruption often induces the risk aversion in the supply chain members. Motivated by this issue, here we propose a coordination mechanism for a risk-averse supply chain using mean–variance approach. Here, we consider both centralized and decentralized cases and show that our analysis holds good for a central planner as well as for a decentralized supply chain under channel coordinating contracts such as buyback and revenue-sharing schemes. With the help of theoretical and numerical analysis, we exhibit how an individual supply chain agent’s risk aversion behavior can impact the contracts selection mechanism - from the profitability perspective. We extend our analysis to a dyadic setting to a single-supplier multiple-retailer network and confirm that pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists when all the retailers are risk-averse with varying risk attitude.
中文翻译:
规避风险的供应链的渠道协调:均值-方差方法
在技术飞速发展和数字化时代,协调策略仍然是供应链的重要问题。此外,由中断引起的不确定性通常会引起供应链成员的风险规避。出于这个问题的动机,在此我们提出一种使用均值-方差方法的规避风险的供应链协调机制。在这里,我们同时考虑了集中式案例和分散式案例,并表明我们的分析对于中央计划者以及渠道协调合同(如回购和收益共享计划)下的分散式供应链都非常有用。借助理论和数值分析,我们从获利能力的角度展示了单个供应链代理商的风险规避行为如何影响合同选择机制。