This article offers a reading of the “transcendental” character of Alain Badiou’s and Giorgio Agamben’s ontologies. While neither Badiou nor Agamben are “transcendental” philosophers in the Kantian sense, this article argues that their respective projects of ontology both recover aspects of the “classical” conception of the transcendentals. Not unlike how pre-modern philosophers conceived of oneness, truth and goodness as transcendental properties of all things, both Badiou’s and Agamben’s ontologies present various structures which can be universally predicated of all being. However, as opposed to the essentialist or even theological tendencies of traditional metaphysics, Badiou’s and Agamben’s ontologies are committedly “inessential” and atheistic at their very core. By replacing the divine names of the one, the true and the good in traditional metaphysics with a new yet quasi-classical transcendental notion of “the void” as a universal predicate of all beings, Badiou’s and Agamben’s works may be regarded as projects that go beyond both the pre-Kantian “theological” and the post-Kantian “subjective” conceptions of transcendental philosophy, thereby marking a new development in the history of western metaphysics.

本文提供了阿兰·巴迪乌（Alain Badiou）和乔治·阿甘本（Giorgio Agamben）本体论的“超越”特征的阅读。尽管Badiou和Agamben都不是康德意义上的“先验”哲学家，但本文认为，他们各自的本体论项目都恢复了先验者“古典”概念的各个方面。与前现代哲学家如何将统一性，真理和善善视为万物的先验特性不同，巴迪欧的本体论和阿甘本的本体论都呈现出各种结构，这些结构可以被普遍地假设为存在。然而，与传统形而上学的本质主义乃至神学倾向相反，巴迪欧和阿甘本的本体论确实是“非本质的”和无神论的。通过替换其中一个的神圣名称，