Why did enduring traditions of economic and political liberty arise in Western Europe? An answer to this question must be sought at the constitutional level. Within the medieval constitutional order, traditions of representative and limited government developed through patterns of constitutional bargaining. The politically fragmented landscape that emerged following the decline of the Western Roman Empire and the barbarian migrations was conducive to those patterns. In particular, that landscape was characterized by polycentric and hierarchical governance structures; within those structures, political property rights holders were sovereign and residual claimants to governance returns. I elaborate on why this environment of polycentric sovereignty promoted constitutional bargaining in the direction of good governance and greater liberty.

中文翻译：

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中世纪欧洲封建主义的政治经济学

为什么经济和政治自由的持久传统会出现在西欧？这个问题的答案必须在宪法层面上寻求。在中世纪的宪政秩序中，代议制和有限政府的传统是通过宪政谈判的模式发展起来的。西罗马帝国衰落和野蛮人迁徙后出现的政治支离破碎的格局有利于这些模式。特别是，这种格局的特点是多中心和等级制的治理结构；在这些结构中，政治财产权持有人是治理回报的主权和剩余索取者。我详细阐述了为什么这种多中心主权的环境会促进宪法谈判朝着善治和更大自由的方向发展。