This paper models a consumer loan market with a vertical structure where an upstream monopolist supplies funds to downstream nonbanks. The nonbanks supply funds to consumers in the consumer loans market. An inverse demand function of the consumer is linear. The downstream nonbank freely enters the market as long as it earns a positive profit. First, this paper derives free-entry equilibrium without government regulation. Next, this paper examines the effects of government regulation on the entry of nonbanks. Two regulatory schemes are investigated: partial regulation, wherein the government can only control the interest rate the monopolist sets, and full regulation, wherein the government can control the number of nonbanks as well as the interest rate. This paper presents four new results. First, downstream firms insufficiently enter the market under partial regulation. Second, downstream firms excessively enter the market under full regulation. Third, the establishment of the upstream public firm improves welfare even though its profit is negative under partial regulation. Fourth, full regulation is welfare improving compared to partial regulation.

中文翻译：

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消费贷款市场的经济监管

本文模拟了一个具有垂直结构的消费贷款市场，其中上游垄断者向下游非银行提供资金。非银行机构在消费贷款市场向消费者提供资金。消费者的逆需求函数是线性的。下游非银行只要赚取正利润就可以自由进入市场。首先，本文推导出没有政府监管的自由进入均衡。接下来，本文考察了政府监管对非银行机构进入的影响。研究了两种监管方案：部分监管，即政府只能控制垄断者设定的利率；全面监管，即政府既可以控制非银行机构的数量，也可以控制利率。本文提出了四个新的结果。第一的，下游企业在部分监管下进入市场不足。二是下游企业在全面监管下过度进入市场。第三，上游上市公司的建立提高了福利，即使在部分监管下其利润为负。第四，与部分监管相比，全面监管是福利的改善。