Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery-related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's recent solution to the problem and argue that it fails. More importantly, the problem reaches deeper and poses a threat to any current safety accounts that require a belief's modal stability in close possibilities (as well as safety accounts that appeal to ‘normality’). We end by arguing that ways out of the problem require substantial reconstruction for a safety-based account of knowledge.

中文翻译：

---

归纳知识和彩票：可以“安全地”解释两者吗？

知识的安全账户粗略地声称，知道p需要一个人相信p不可能是假的。这种说法在最近的认识论中非常流行。然而，安全账户必须面对的一个严重问题是解释为什么某些与彩票相关的信念不是知识，而不排除归纳知识的明显实例。我们认为，迄今为止，安全支持者并未充分认识到这一反对意见的重要性。我们讨论了邓肯·普里查德 (Duncan Pritchard) 最近对该问题的解决方案，并认为它失败了。更重要的是，这个问题会变得更深，并对任何当前的安全账户构成威胁，这些账户需要信念在接近的可能性中的模态稳定性（以及诉诸“常态”的安全账户）。我们最后认为，解决问题的方法需要对基于安全的知识帐户进行大量重构。